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Abstract
Environmental events such as natural disasters may influence the public’s affective reactions and decisions. Shortly
after the 2004 Tsunami disaster we assessed how affect elicited by thinking about this disaster influenced risk perceptions
and future time perspective in Swedish undergraduates not directly affected by the disaster. An experimental manipu-
lation was used to increase the salience of affect associated with the disaster. In Study 1 we found that participants
reminded about the tsunami had a sense that their life was more finite and included fewer opportunities than participants
in the control condition (not reminded about the tsunami). In Study 2 we found similar effects for risk perceptions. In
addition, we showed that manipulations of ease-of-thought influenced the extent to which affect influenced these risk
perceptions, with greater ease of thoughts being associated with greater perceived risks.
Keywords: affect, risk perception, disaster.
1 Introduction
Major societal events such as natural disasters and terror-
ist attacks influence our thoughts and feelings. In the face
of a major environmental event, many people tend to react
with emotion and emotion-laden decisions (Lerner et al.,
2003). The 2004 East Asian tsunami disaster had a pro-
found psychological impact on many countries, not only
those that were directly hit by the tsunami waves. Sweden
(pop. 9 million) had an unusually high number of tourists
visiting the area at the time of the disaster, resulting in
over six hundred Swedes being killed or missing. The
Tsunami disaster was therefore considered a major na-
tional tragedy in Sweden (Grandien, Nord, & Strömbäck,
2005). A consequence of this tragedy, and the media at-
tention it received (Mann, 2007), was that many Swedes
felt deeply involved and saddened (Grandien et al., 2005).
The feelings elicited by such an event may also have an
impact on everyday decisions. Previous research in judg-
ment and decision making has shown that preferences
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are constructed on the basis of various contextual factors
(such as incidental affect or mood; Lichtenstein & Slovic,
2006; Peters, 2006; Johnson & Tversky, 1983) and peo-
ple tend to rely on their affective reactions when making
decisions (Slovic et al., 2002; see also Pfister & Böhm,
this issue).
Affect is defined here as the specific quality of good-
ness or badness experienced as a feeling state (with or
without awareness) and demarcating a positive or nega-
tive quality of a stimulus.1 Reliance on such feelings in
judgment and decision making has earlier been described
as an affect heuristic (Finucane et al., 2000; Slovic et
al., 2002). Most previous research on affect and decision
making has focused on integral affect (affect attached to
mental representations of objects; Slovic et al., 2002).
However, in many judgments other sources of affect are
also present. A large number of studies shows that affec-
tive states that are unrelated to the judgmental target in-
fluence judgments and decisions nonetheless (Isen, 1997;
1Affective responses can occur rapidly and automatically, and may
be elicited by stimulus properties, physical stimulation, perception of
one´s immediate environment, thoughts and memories, or propriocep-
tive cues (Schwarz & Clore, 2007). Mood, one form of affect, is a
relatively stable and mild affective state that does not have a specific fo-
cal object (Morris, 1999), whereas emotions, another form of affect, are
more intense and are of shorter duration. Incidental affect is an affective
state, such as a mood state, brought about by environmental or intrinsic
stimulation. Integral affect, on the other hand, is elicited by perceiving
the target or a mental representation of the target.
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Schwarz & Clore, 1983). In a famous example, Johnson
and Tversky (1983) found that incidental affect (i.e., a
mood state) induced by reading a newspaper article influ-
enced subsequent risk judgments.
However, the effect of incidental affect on judgments is
not a stable, unchangeable or unavoidable fact; it should
rather be seen as a constructive process where the indi-
vidual tries to determine if their affective reactions to a
target are a reliable and relevant source of information
(Clore & Huntsinger, 2007). At the core of this argu-
ment lies the notion that when asked to make an eval-
uative judgment, individuals seek information to deter-
mine how they should make this judgment. People tend
to use whatever information is available to them at the
time of making a decision (Clore & Huntsinger, 2007;
Schwarz, 2004). In the absence of other relevant or more
salient information, people use their affective reactions
to the target to evaluate the object (Pham, 1998; see also
deVries, Witteman & Holland, this issue). People in
positive moods tend to evaluate objects more favorably
than participants in a negative mood (mood-congruence;
Schwarz & Clore, 1983; but see Andrade, 2005 for a dis-
cussion about mood-incongruent effects). One important
point here is that people incorrectly attribute their inci-
dental moods as a reaction to the target. This misattri-
bution can be corrected or changed by introducing infor-
mation that questions the diagnostic value of the affec-
tive reaction for the judgment. For instance, in Schwarz
and Clore’s (1983) study participants were given a sim-
ple reminder about the cause (sunny vs. cloudy weather)
of their moods which resulted in mood no longer influ-
encing judgments of well-being. Importantly though, it
was the diagnostic value of the affective reaction for the
judgment task, not the affective reaction itself, that was
affected by this manipulation (Schwarz, 2004).
Incidental mood is only one of many sources of expe-
riential information that can be used in judgments. The
meta-cognitive experience of the ease or fluency of in-
formation processing has been shown to be an important
experiential factor informing judgments and decisions
(Schwarz & Clore, 2007). In a study on the effect of flu-
ency on decision making, participants were more likely to
defer choice when they generated more reasons for mak-
ing the choice (thus decreasing fluency; Novemsky, Dhar,
Schwarz & Simonson, 2007). Studies on perceptual flu-
ency (the subjective ease of perceptual processing) have
found that if the color in which a statement is printed
makes it easy to read, this can impact the perceived truth-
fulness of the statement (with an easier-to-read font lead-
ing to a higher probability of endorsing a statement as
true; Reber & Schwarz, 1999). Thus, as Schwarz (2004,
p. 341) notes, it seems that “the subjective experiences
that accompany our thought processes are informative in
their own right.” Consequently, meta-cognitive feelings
may further modulate the impact of affect on judgments.
Supporting this, a study by Lerner and Gonzalez (2005)
showed that fluency manipulations influenced the effect
of specific emotions on risk perception.
The conceptual model guiding this research can be de-
scribed in the following way: 1) We expect that major
environmental events such as a natural disaster may in-
fluence experienced affect even among individuals not
directly affected by the disaster. 2) The experienced af-
fect will, in turn, impact various affective and cogni-
tive judgments. 3) The effects of affect incidental to the
judgment task can be diminished by introducing infor-
mation (such as fluency manipulations) that questions the
diagnostic value of experienced feelings for judgments.
Specifically, we tested the prediction that affect elicited
by thinking about a recent major natural disaster would
influence judgments of well-being (Schwarz & Clore,
1983) and future pessimistic/optimistic thinking (Wright
& Bower, 1992) in a mood-congruent manner (Schwarz
& Clore, 2007). Previous research has documented the
effects of laboratory-induced mood using standardized
mood induction procedures (autobiographical recall or
affect-inducing scenarios). We extended this research by
inducing affect through a procedure in which participants
were asked to think about a recent and relevant major en-
vironmental disaster.
Our research strategy compared ratings of affect and
ratings of future personal and societal events in two
groups of participants, one reminded about the tsunami
and a control group. We hypothesized that reminding
participants about the tsunami would elicit negative af-
fect associated with the event. We further anticipated that
this affect would spill over to judgments of well-being as
well as optimistic/pessimistic thinking.
In Study 1, participants in both conditions completed
a measure of future pessimism (future time perspective
(FTP) scale, Lang & Carstensen, 2002) and rated their
well-being (Pavot & Diener, 1993). The FTP scale was
originally developed as an individual difference mea-
sure of the perceived time remaining in life (Carstensen,
2006). In Study 1, we used the FTP scale as a depen-
dent variable and we expected to find that individuals re-
minded about the tsunami perceived life as more finite
and limited than participants in a control condition. In
Study 2, half of the participants in the tsunami-remind
condition were given an additional experimental manipu-
lation (ease-of-thought-generation; Schwarz, 2004). Par-
ticipants then made risk estimates of various future posi-
tive and negative events (Lerner & Gonzalez, 2005). We
expected that this manipulation of the ease with which ex-
amples of other disasters comes to mind would influence
the diagnostic value of feelings for judgments of future
risk, but it does not change the feelings themselves.
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2 Study 1. Future time perspective
As people grow older they experience time as more lim-
ited, closed, and finite (Carstensen, 2006). However,
chronological age is not the only determinant of how the
future is perceived. For instance, Fung and Carstensen
(2006) showed that younger adults prioritized emotional
goals, a behavior indicative of a limited time perspective,
when facing a major environmental event (i.e., the SARS
epidemic). Building on these findings, we hypothesized
that participants reminded about the tsunami would ex-
perience a more limited future time perspective than par-
ticipants in a control condition. In addition, we expected
that participants reminded about the tsunami would ex-
perience stronger negative affect and lessened well-being
compared to the control group and that this difference
would account for the hypothesized difference between
conditions.
2.1 Method and measures
Twenty-eight men and 77 women with a mean age of 25.3
(SD = 4.1) participated. Data were collected in Sweden
during the Spring of 2005, roughly 3–5 months after the
tsunami disaster. The tsunami was still very actively cov-
ered by the media in Sweden during this time (Mann,
2007).
To manipulate access to feelings, we used an experi-
mental approach resembling the techniques developed by
Lerner et al. (2003) and studies on affective imagery and
decision making (Slovic, 1995). In a between-groups de-
sign, half of the participants were asked to write down
the first three images that came to mind when hearing
the word “tsunami”. The other half of the participants
(the control condition) were asked to produce images to
a neutral word (“round”). Pre-testing showed that this
priming manipulation made affect2 associated with the
tsunami disaster salient (Siemer & Reisenzein, 1998) and
provided us with the opportunity to study the relative im-
pact of affect in the two conditions.
After the experimental manipulation, participants re-
sponded to a series of questions. To measure future
time perspective, a version of the FTP scale (Lang &
Carstensen, 2002) was used. The measure contains eight
items: 1. Many opportunities await me in the future. 2.
My future is filled with possibilities. 3. Most of my life
lies ahead of me. 4. My future seems infinite to me. 5.
There is plenty of time left in my life to make new plans.
6. I have the sense that time is running out. 7. There are
only limited possibilities in my future. 8. As I get older,
I begin to experience time as more limited. Participants
2Pre-testing showed that this procedure in general heightened neg-
ative feelings such as sadness, depression, and anxiety and no specific
emotion was more salient.
Table 1: Means and inferential statistics (df = 102) for
mood and specific emotion ratings obtained in the exper-
imental and control conditions.
Measure Tsunami-remind Control t p <
Mood scales
Valence −1.11 0.67 13.20 .01
Activation 1.33 0.20 9.16 .01
Emotion scales
Sad 2.71 0.99 14.42 .001
Depressed 2.14 1.08 8.11 .001
Anxious 2.34 1.02 6.92 .01
Afraid 1.99 0.53 9.40 .001
Worried 2.25 0.87 10.65 .001
Angry 2.04 0.46 15.19 .001
responded to the question “How well does each question
describe you” by circling a number between 1 (not at all)
and 7 (very well). The measure was reverse-scored where
appropriate and averaged across the eight items (Cron-
bach’s alpha = .77) into a single index; higher values
indicated a more closed or limited future time perspec-
tive. In addition, the Pavot and Diener (1993) subjective
well-being scale as well as mood and specific-emotion
scales (Västfjäll et al., 2002) were administered. The
mood scale consisted of six adjective pairs found in pre-
vious research (Västfjäll et al., 2002) to tap valence and
activation, respectively. Sleepy-awake, dull-peppy, and
passive-active were used to define the activation scale,
displeased-pleased, sad-glad, and depressed-happy were
used to define the valence scale. Participants were asked
to circle a number (range = −4 to 0 to +4) that best cor-
responded with their current feeling. The three adjectives
tapping each dimension were averaged into two index
variables corresponding to valence and activation, respec-
tively.
The specific emotion scale consisted of the adjectives
sad, depressed, anxious, worried, afraid, and angry. Par-
ticipants were asked to rate how intensely they felt each
emotion by circling a number on a unipolar scale an-
chored by 0 (not at all) to 6 (very much).
2.2 Results and discussion
To show that affect indeed was more negative in the
tsunami-remind condition than in the control condition,
the mood and emotion ratings were submitted to a series
of independent t-tests. Negative affect ratings were sig-
nificantly higher in the experimental condition suggesting
that the manipulation was successful (see Table 1).
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Figure 1: Mediation analysis of Condition and Subjective
well-being (SWL) on Future Time Perspective (FTP).
In order to test the primary research hypotheses, that
well-being should be lower and FTP more limited in the
tsunami-remind condition than in the control condition,
two contrasts were performed. As expected, participants
reminded about the tsunami rated their overall well-being
as lower (M = 3.81) than participants in the control con-
dition (M = 4.50), t(103) = 9.09, p < .001. Similarly, FTP
was more limited (M = 4.80) in the tsunami-remind con-
dition than in the control condition (M =3.22), t(103) =
2.92, p < .001.
The finding that the experimental manipulation in-
creased negative affect which, in turn, decreased over-
all subjective well-being is a replication of Schwarz and
Clore’s findings (1983). The result that future time per-
spective changed with experienced affect is, however, a
novel demonstration. To further show that affect influ-
enced FTP judgments, we conducted a mediation anal-
ysis. Because both affect and well-being ratings were
more negative in the experimental condition, we decided
to test whether well-being (as an overall proxy of affect)
mediated the effect of condition on FTP. The choice of
well-being ratings as an overall measure of affect was
motivated by literature on happiness that suggested that
current feelings are integrated into more global assess-
ments of affective well-being (Schwarz & Clore, 1983;
Schwarz & Strack, 1999). The subjective well-being
measure however includes aspects other than experienced
feelings (e.g., life circumstances; Diener, 1984; Pavot &
Diener, 1993) and when used as a variable in a media-
tion analysis it may be more conservative than ratings of
current affect.3 To test mediation, a series of regression
models were estimated (Baron & Kenny, 1986). To ex-
amine the degree of mediation, we first regressed subjec-
tive well-being on the condition variable, then regressed
FTP on the condition variable, and finally regressed FTP
on both the condition variable and subjective-well being.
The degree to which the influence of condition on FTP is
reduced when accounting for the influence of subjective
well-being expresses the degree of mediation.
The results of these regression analyses are depicted in
3Analyses with either the valence mood index or the composite spe-
cific emotion index as mediating variables yielded comparable results
to the well-being ratings. Subjective well being had strong correlates
with these two indices (r = .71 and .68, respectively, p < .01).
Figure 1. Subjective well-being mediated the influence
of condition on FTP. Specifically: (a) condition predicted
SWL (F(1,103) = 8.59, regression weight = .27, p < .05);
(b) condition predicted FTP (F(1,103) = 82.69, regres-
sion weight = .67, p < .01); (c) Subjective well-being
predicted FTP (F(1,103) = 25.91, regression weight =
.45, p < .01); and (d) the condition variable dropped
significantly when controlling for Subjective well-being
(F(2,102) = 6.37, regression weight = −.08, ns.).
Taken together, these findings suggest that thinking
about a major environmental event such as the Tsunami
disaster elicits negative feelings (as indexed by specific
emotion/mood ratings as well as well-being ratings).
These feelings in turn influence how people think about
and view their future possibilities. Negative feelings lead
individuals to be more pessimistic, viewing time as more
limited and holding fewer possibilities. Although the
FTP scale was originally developed as an individual dif-
ference measure (Lang & Carstensen, 2002), the find-
ings here suggest that it also can be used as a depen-
dent variable measuring group differences. In contrast
to the present findings, previous research has shown that
the FTP measure is relatively uncorrelated with current
mood (Lang & Carstensen, 2002). However, these stud-
ies have not experimentally manipulated moods which
may be why mood effects were not obtained. The FTP
scale is used here as a measure of pessimism and the
link between mood and optimism-pessimism is well doc-
umented in the mood literature (Isen, 1997; Wright &
Bower, 1992). Although the finding that participants in
the experimental condition experienced a more limited
FTP may be predicted from previous research without
involving experienced affect as an explanatory variable
(Fung & Carstensen, 2006), we extend this research by
showing that well-being mediates the effect.
A limited future time perspective may have many detri-
mental consequences for different individual behaviors
such as preference for immediate consumption of food
and money at the cost of long-term health behavior and
well-being (Shiv et al., 2005). In Study 2, we study risk
perception in different domains of one’s future life and
also test potential measures to counteract the negative im-
pact of feelings on judgments.
3 Study 2. Future life expectations
and ease-of-thought
In Study 2, future pessimism was assessed by obtaining
risk estimates of future events across different decision
domains. As in Study 1, a between-groups comparison
was used (remind about the tsunami vs. a control group).
In addition, we assessed whether the ease with which
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol. 3, No. 1, January 2008 Affect and future optimism 68
thoughts about other natural disasters comes to mind may
modulate the impact of feelings on risk perception. Pre-
vious research has demonstrated that the ease or fluency
of thoughts and feelings determines the impact of those
thoughts and feelings on judgment (Schwarz, 2004). For
example, participants asked to generate eight examples of
behaviors that increased the risk of heart disease (a rela-
tively difficult task) were more likely to report that they
were invulnerable to heart-disease problems than partic-
ipants asked to generate three examples (an easy task;
Rothman & Schwarz, 1998). The explanation for this
result is that participants in the generate-eight condition
noticed how difficult it was to think of examples and, on
the basis of that difficulty, thought that they must be rela-
tively invulnerable to heart disease.
Building on this logic, we asked participants to list a
more difficult six (versus an easier two) examples of ma-
jor natural disasters during the last one hundred years. We
expected that participants in the difficult condition should
notice that such events are very rare and thus experience
less confidence in their feelings about the tsunami disas-
ter as a basis for risk judgments. In other words, the diffi-
cult ease-of-thought generation should render incidental
affect from the tsunami disaster relatively less diagnostic
for judgments (Pham, 1998).
The design of Study 2 closely resembles Lerner and
Gonzalez’s (2005) Study 1, but with one important dif-
ference: Rather than studying the effects of specific emo-
tions we focus on the effects of generalized moods on
risk perception. We predict (in line with Lerner and Gon-
zalez’s findings for specific emotions) that an ease-of-
thought manipulation will interact with the effects of inci-
dental affect on judgments, effectively debiasing risk esti-
mates in the hard (list many) condition but not in the easy
(list few). However, since the affect induced by think-
ing about the tsunami does not directly rely on the ease
with which one can list six vs. two other major disas-
ters, it may be predicted that well-being ratings will be
relatively untouched by this manipulation. Thus, we ex-
pect that one experimental manipulation (tsunami-remind
vs. control) will influence both well-being and risk per-
ception, whereas the second experimental manipulation
(ease-of-thought) will only influence risk perception.
3.1 Method and measures
Fifty men and 75 women with a mean age of 27.1 (SD
= 6.2) participated. The study was run in Sweden 3–4
months after the tsunami disaster.
In addition to the tsunami-reminder manipulation used
in Study 1, half of the participants in the remind condi-
tion were given an “ease-of-thought-generation” manip-
ulation (Schwarz, 2004) in which they were asked to list
either six (hard) or two (easy) other major natural disas-
ters that occurred anywhere in the world during the last
100 years.4 After the experimental manipulation, partici-
pants responded to a series of questions. To measure risk
perception, we used a modified version of the scale devel-
oped by Lerner and Gonzalez (2005). Participants indi-
cated from 1 (extremely unlikely) to 7 (extremely likely)
the likelihood that each of 15 events would happen to
them at any point in their future life. This measure is
thus similar to the FTP scale in that it taps future pes-
simism. However, rather than asking specific questions
about the remaining time in life and the possibility of
changing one’s circumstances, the risk perception scale
asks participants to judge the likelihood of various posi-
tive and negative events in different life domains (social,
health, financial, recreational). The 15 items were: 1. I
enjoyed my job. 2. I had a heart attack before age 50. 3.
My achievements were written up in a newspaper. 4. I
chose the wrong career. 5. I married someone wealthy.
6. I received recognition in my profession. 7. I could not
find a job for 6 months. 8. My income doubled within
10 years after my first job. 9. I developed gum problems
in my mouth. 10. I did something in a job interview that
made me embarrassed. 11. I said something idiotic in
front of my class mates. 12. I got lost at night for more
than 15 minutes. 13. I was on an airplane that encoun-
tered severe turbulence. 14. I received favorable medical
tests at age 60. 15. I encountered a dangerous snake while
on vacation.
The measure was averaged (with reverse scoring for
the appropriate items) across the 15 items into an overall
pessimistic future risk index (Cronbach’s alpha = .89).
In addition, the Pavot and Diener (1993) subjective well-
being scale used in Study 1 was administered.5
Overall, we expected that participants in the tsunami-
remind condition who were asked to list few natu-
ral disasters (easy condition) would give more pes-
simistic risk estimates than participants in the control and
tsunami-remind difficult (list many natural disasters) con-
dition. Furthermore, we expected that participants in the
tsunami-remind conditions would report an overall lower
well-being than participants in the control condition, in-
dependent of the ease-of-thought manipulation.
3.2 Results and discussion
To test the hypotheses, three contrasts were performed for
both the subjective well-being ratings and the risk esti-
4The ease-of-thought manipulation was only used in the tsunami-
remind conditions since our hypothesis pertains to the debiasing effect
of this manipulation in this experimental condition.
5Mood and discrete emotion scales were however not included in
this study. We chose to only include well-being as a measure of affect
since both pre-studies and Study 1 consistently showed that negative
affect ratings discriminated between the two conditions and, further,
that these ratings co-varied with well-being ratings (see footnote 3).
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mates. As expected, participants in the control condition
reported significantly higher well-being (M = 4.86) than
participants in the tsunami-remind difficult (M = 3.95,
t(74) = 3:30, p < .05) and the tsunami-remind easy (M
=3.82, t(82) = 3.79, p < .05) conditions. The difficult and
easy conditions did not differ (t(88) = 0.43, ns).
For the risk estimates, participants in the control condi-
tion reported less pessimistic estimates (M = −.19) than
participants in the tsunami-remind easy condition (M =
−.96, t(74) =5.18, p < .01), but similar estimates to the
participants in the tsunami-remind difficult (M = −.22,
t(73) = - 0.13, ns). Further, risk estimates in the easy con-
dition were significantly higher than those in the difficult
condition (t(87) = 4.75, p < .01).
Taken together, these findings suggest that thinking
about the tsunami decreased perceived well-being and
systematically biased risk estimates. In addition, the ef-
fect on risk estimates was modulated by the ease with
which participants could list few versus many natural
disasters. Combining the logic of research on fluency
(Schwarz, 2004) and mood effects (Schwarz & Clore,
2007), generating many disasters (hard condition) likely
produced the experience of difficulty/low fluency, which
then caused the participants in the hard condition to ques-
tion the diagnostic value of their feelings for estimat-
ing risk. In the easy condition, the subjective ease-of-
thought/fluency should explain why these participants
were less likely to question the validity of their feel-
ings for the judgment task. These findings are consis-
tent with previous research on fluency and decision mak-
ing (Lerner & Gonzalez, 2005; Novemsky et al., 2007).
In addition to this replication, we found that the ease-
of-thought manipulation did not substantially influence
ratings of well-being. Schwarz (2004) suggested that
the subjective experience of fluency is a form of meta-
cognitive experience that helps inform judgments. While
the validity and relevance of feelings as a proxy of risk
estimates may have been called into question by the flu-
ency manipulation, there is little reason why the validity
of the feelings per se should be questioned by this ma-
nipulation. However, previous research has noted that
the experience of fluency may generate positive affect
which potentially could influence the obtained difference
between the easy and hard conditions (Reber, Schwarz &
Winkielman, 2004). Several suggestions regarding why
fluency is marked with positive affect have been offered,
ranging from perceptual harmony to the adaptive value
of processing information with ease (Schwarz & Clore,
2007). While we cannot completely refute the possibil-
ity that the fluency manipulation induced positive affect
in the present research, the finding that well-being ratings
were comparable in the hard vs. easy conditions suggests
that this effect was minor. Most importantly, even if par-
ticipants in the easy condition had more positive affect
than participants in the hard condition, this feeling did
not impact the judgment task. If the positive affect asso-
ciated with fluency had spilled over to the risk estimates,
we would expect that participants in the easy condition
would have rated the risk of future negative outcomes
lower than participants in the hard condition. However,
the reverse pattern was found, suggesting that the pos-
itive affect associated with fluency experiences neither
changed the negative affect elicited by the experimental
manipulation, nor did it influence the judgment task.
4 General Discussion
The results of these studies suggest that the negative af-
fect elicited by thinking about a recent major natural
disaster leads to a more pessimistic view of the future.
Participants reminded about the recent tsunami disaster
felt that their life had fewer possibilities and that time
was limited (Study 1) and that the risk of future self-
relevant negative events was high and the likelihood of
positive events was low (Study 2). This finding is consis-
tent with other research documenting the effects of emo-
tions elicited by major events on judgment and decision-
making (Lerner et al., 2003). The implication of this in-
fusion of affect in everyday judgment is vast. Not only
may judgments be affected when the affect is considered
relevant, such as the perceived risk of travelling to areas
affected by the disaster, but also perhaps affected are ev-
eryday decisions concerning consumption, health, social
and financial domains.
Emotions and moods are usually determined in a
highly idiosyncratic manner (Morris, 1999) suggesting
that the overall effect of feelings on individual every-
day decisions will vary considerably across individu-
als. Therefore, the net effect on a societal level will
vary depending on the mean mood of the population
(Hirschliefer & Shumway, 2003). However, in the case
of affect elicited by an event that is important or relevant
for a whole society or country, the impact of affect on in-
dividual decisions as well societal decisions may be much
more homogenous and far-reaching. The current research
does not speak directly to this issue since we did not di-
rectly assess this type of national mood change in a whole
population. Instead, we studied a sample of people who
recently experienced the aftermath of natural disaster. Al-
though it is difficult to conclude with certainty that the
experimental approach used here is representative of the
effects on a whole population, a comparison with other
data suggests that the reactions of our participants resem-
bled that of the larger population. In other studies con-
ducted in Sweden using nationally representative samples
immediately following the tsunami, and six months later,
we have found effects on judgment tasks similar to those
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found in the present study, suggesting that the experimen-
tal manipulation used here is a reasonably valid approach
to investigate the effects of feelings associated with the
tsunami disaster (Västfjäll, Peters & Slovic, 2007).
Does this suggest that affect elicited by a major natu-
ral disaster, and its effect on judgments, is different from
other type of mood effects? Previous research studying
the emotional impact of natural disasters/major events
has found that generalized anxiety and depression (Lau
et al., 2006), negative well-being (Grandien et al., 2005)
and negative specific emotions (Lerner et al., 2003) tend
to increase compared to normal times. The results from
the manipulation check in Study 1 seem consistent with
this increased negative response in that the experimen-
tal manipulation resulted in a general increase in specific
negative emotions and negatively valenced mood. Again,
this finding is in line with the results of the nationally
representative sample; immediately after the tsunami,
a generalized negative response was found. When the
same negative emotions were measured six months later,
all ratings significantly decreased (Västfjäll, Peters &
Slovic, 2007). Other studies using nationally represen-
tative Swedish samples have found similar effects (Gran-
dien et al., 2005). As pointed out earlier, it seems that
the main difference between a normal mood change and
a change brought about by a natural disaster lies in the
fact that national moods are large-scale reactions that may
be quite homogenous across individuals. Further, this
type of affect is continually bolstered by new information
(from media, other people, etc.; Mann, 2007) that is as-
sociated with uncertainty (How many people were killed?
Did I know someone who went on vacation in Thailand?),
and may therefore not dissipate as quickly as a normal
change in mood (Russell, 2003). This type of change in
affective tone or affective background may therefore be
more similar to chronic impairments of the mood system
(Morris, 1999). However, research has demonstrated that
chronic affect influences risk perceptions and judgments
in similar ways to normal incidental mood (Gasper &
Clore, 1998). For that reason, we expect that the present
results will be informative for any type of study on affect
and its impact on judgments.
Another major finding was that the potentially large
impact of affect on behavior was mitigated by very subtle
manipulations of the ease with which examples of other
disasters came to mind. The result that participants who
were asked to list many (in contrast to few) other natu-
ral disasters corrected for the effect of their feelings on
risk estimates is consistent with the notion that meta-
cognitive processes have important biasing/debiasing ef-
fects on judgments (Schwarz et al., 2007). The extent of
correction on judgments may depend on the naive theory
used by the participant (Schwarz, 2004). In the present
case, it seems likely that participants realized that natural
disasters are relatively rare phenomena and tried to cor-
rect for this by minimizing reliance on their affective re-
actions. However, it may be argued that this assumes that
participants were aware of their reactions, what caused
them, and had a naive theory about how feelings may spill
over to judgments. The present results cannot be used
to infer the exact psychological mechanisms involved in
these correction effects and future research is needed to
resolve this issue. However, the mere fact that correction
processes could be relatively easily elicited using sim-
ple manipulations has important implications for every-
day judgments. Many of the negative effects of the feel-
ings associated with a major environmental event such as
risk aversion concerning travel after a disaster (Grandien
et al., 2005) and over-insurance when affective images of
terrorism are made salient (Hsee & Kunreuther, 2000),
as well as the impact of those feelings on everyday deci-
sions, could be mitigated by simple reminders of the low
probability of the event. However, rather than simply stat-
ing that the event is of low probability (experience by de-
scription; Hertwig et al., 2004), fluency manipulations let
individuals experience (through meta-cognitive feelings)
that the event is unlikely. Such manipulations may prove
to be more effective than traditional means of providing
debiasing information (Schwarz et al., 2007). Although
beyond the scope of the current article, future research
could further address this issue by contrasting debiasing
techniques that rely on description against techniques re-
lying on experiential information. However, the finding
that experienced feelings were relatively unaffected by
the fluency manipulations suggests that the potential im-
pact of affect may persist over time. The implication of
this finding is that debiasing strategies would need to be
used repeatedly for each new judgment for the duration
of the mood.
Another force counteracting the effects of fluency
is motivated information processing. Rothman and
Schwarz (1998) found that fluency effects could be re-
versed when participants were motivated to think about
an issue carefully. It is thus possible that strategies rely-
ing on low fluency to debias affect-laden risk perception
could backfire and individuals still would exhibit biased
judgments similar to that of individuals not using these
strategies.
Overall, this research suggests that major environmen-
tal events may send psychological ripples globally, with
the consequence that individuals and societies remote
from the actual disaster may change their everyday deci-
sion behavior. The findings reported here may be used to
better understand public risk perception and decision be-
havior in the aftermath of natural disasters. Further, the
present research is a first step towards developing means
to counteract the sometimes negative impact of feelings
on judgments.
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